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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical foundation which supports the
degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems. The
core of the argument is that each individual derives utility from the fact
that the collective decision matches her own will with some frequency,
with marginal utility decreasing with respect to this frequency. Then
classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules
which exhibit degressive proportionality. The model is applied to the
case of the 27 states of the European Union.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Consider a situation in which repeated decisions have to be taken under the
(possibly qualiﬁed) majority rule by representatives of groups (e.g. coun-
tries) that diﬀer in size. In this case, the principle of equal representation
translates into a principle of proportional apportionment. In other words, if
we require each representative to represent the same number of individuals,
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School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, BETA (Universite´ de Strasbourg) and
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the number of representatives of a group should be proportional to its pop-
ulation. Arguments have been raised against this principle and in favor of
a principle of degressive proportionality, according to which the ratio of the
number of representatives to the population size should decrease with the
population size rather than be constant.
The degressive proportionality principle is endorsed by most politicians
and actually enforced, up to some qualiﬁcations, in the European institutions
(Duﬀ 2010a, 2010b, TEU 2010). It is sometimes termed the Lamassoure-
Severin requirement, following the European Parliament Resolution on “Pro-
posal to amend the Treaty provisions concerning the composition of the
European Parliament,” which was adopted on October 11, 2007 after the
report by Lamassoure and Severin (2007). On that occasion, it was noted
that the treaties and amendments of the European Union has been referring
to degressive proportionality “without deﬁning this term in any more precise
way.” The October 2007 Resolution stated:
[The European Parliament] considers that the principle of de-
gressive proportionality means that the ratio between the popu-
lation and the number of seats of each Member State must vary
in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each
Member from a more populous Member State represents more
citizens than each Member from a less populous Member State
and conversely, but also that no less populous Member State has
more seats than a more populous Member State.
It is known that, in the case of a Parliament, in which each member must
have one and only one vote, the degressive proportionality requirement is
impossible to satisfy exactly, due to unavoidable rounding problems (see for
instance Cichocki and Z˙yczkowski, 2010). But if one seeks to respect the
principle “up to one”, or “before rounding”, then many solutions become
available, among which one has to choose (Ramı´rez-Gonza´lez, Palomares
and Marquez 2006; Mart´ınez-Aroza and Ramı´rez-Gonza´lez 2008; Grimmet
et al. 2011). Such is also the case (rather obviously) if one allows for
fractional weights.
The same principles formally apply to the case where a country is repre-
sented by a number of representatives, each of whom is given one vote, and
to the case where a country is represented by a single delegate who is given
a weight in relation to the country size. We shall refer to the two cases as a
Parliament and a Council.
This paper applies Normative Economics to Politics. Its aim is to justify
the principle of degressive proportionality by an optimality argument and
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thereby to suggest the computation of optimal weights in speciﬁc instances,
optimal weights which will be degressively proportional. Here is a sketch of
the argument.
1.2 Illustration of the argument
The argument in favor of degressively proportional apportionment is based
on the maximization of an explicit utilitarian social criterion. To evaluate
a constitutional rule at the collective level, one has to describe how the so-
ciety evaluates the fact that the will of each citizen is reﬂected in the social
decision under the rule. Assume that a series of collective decisions (issues)
are taken independently under the rule, and that each individual’s utility,
say u(t), is a function of the number of issues for which the decision matches
her own will. Since the issues are independent, von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility derived from the decision rule is a function of the frequency
with which her will is implemented under the rule, say ψ(p).1 We assume
that u has positive and decreasing marginal values. Then, it is straight-
forward to show that ψ is also increasing and concave. Asymptotically,
concavity of these two functions are equivalent. The intuition is that, when
the number of issues T is large, the expected payoﬀ is approximated by
u(Tp).
The social objective is simply the sum of such individual utilities. The
argument can be explained with a very simple example.
Suppose there are only two countries, of size n1 and n2, with n1 < n2.
Then, the majority rule gives full power to the big country. When the two
countries agree on which decision to take, they are both satisﬁed, but when
they disagree, country 1, the small one, is never satisﬁed. Intuition, in that
case, recommends that the power to decide should be occasionally given to
the small country. To be more speciﬁc, suppose that binary decisions have
to be taken according to the same decision rule. Among these decisions,
a fraction α is controversial in the sense that the two countries disagree.
Suppose also, for the simplicity of the example, that the citizens within
each country always agree on their best choice.
Under the majority rule, a citizen of country 2 is satisﬁed with proba-
bility 1, and a citizen of country 1 is satisﬁed with probability 1 − α. The
social welfare, deﬁned as the sum of individual utilities, is:
n1ψ(1− α) + n2ψ(1),
1This frequency p is determined as a function of the decision rule. In the power-
measurement literature, it is called the Rae Index (Rae (1969)).
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because the will of the small (resp. big) country’s citizens is fulﬁlled with
probability 1− α (resp. 1).
Imagine, for the sake of illustration, that when they disagree, the deci-
sions are delegated at random to one or the other country with respective
probabilities q1 and q2 = 1 − q1. Then the frequency of a decision opposed
to country 1’s will is αq2, and the social value is:
U(q1) = n1ψ(1− αq2) + n2ψ(1− αq1).
If ψ is linear then the maximum of utility is achieved for q1 = 0, that is
the majority rule, but if ψ is concave the maximum may be achieved at
some interior point 0 < q1 < 1. More exactly, the condition for an interior
optimum is that the marginal social beneﬁt at point q1 = 0,
U ′(0) = α
(
n1ψ
′(1− α)− n2ψ′(1)
)
,
be positive, that is:
n1
n2
>
ψ′(1)
ψ′(1− α) .
Such a condition is satisﬁed if the two countries are not too diﬀerent in size,
or if the marginal utility ψ′ is rapidly decreasing with the probability p. In
that case the optimal value of q is some number between 0 and 1 such that:
n1ψ
′(1− αq2) = n2ψ′(1− αq1).
Thus majority rule is sub-optimal. The optimal voting rule in this two-
country example involves randomization. In what follows, randomization
will be required only in case of exact equality between the total weights of
countries in favor of the two alternatives, an event which is unavoidable but
occurs rarely among many countries.2 The point here is that, when marginal
utilities are decreasing with p, the optimal organization entails giving way to
a smaller country relatively more often than proportionality would suggest.
We will build a stochastic model to render the above ideas and apply it to
the 27 countries of the European Union.
1.3 Adjacent literature
Most of the existing literature on the subject deals with the measurement
of voting power and the tricky combinatorics arising from the diﬀerent ways
2In the numerical example that we will take, the 27 Member States of the European
Union, we will obtain that the probability of a tie is on the order of 10−7.
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to form a winning coalition with integer-weighted votes; see the books by
Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2008). Our
focus is diﬀerent, as can be seen from the two-country example above. The
point made in the present paper rests on the non-linearity of ψ. It should be
contrasted with the other contributions which derive an optimal rule from
an explicit social criterion.
The ﬁrst, and now classical, argument proposed in favor of degressive
proportionality rests on statistical reasonings leading to the Penrose Law,
which stipulates that the weight of a country should be proportional to the
square root of the population rather than to the population itself, a pattern
that exhibits degressive proportionality (Penrose 1946). The mathemati-
cal reason why the square root appears in this literature is linked to the
assumption made that, within each country, voters’ opinions are indepen-
dent random variables3 (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998); Ramirez et
al. (2006); S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2010); Maaser and Napel (2011)).
The political argument is that, in a world where frontiers have no link with
the citizens’ opinions, the representatives may as well be selected at random
with no reference to these countries, but if representatives have to be chosen
country-wise, then the focus should be on the statistical quality of the rep-
resentation of the country by its constituents as a function of the size of the
country. This argument is diﬀerent from the one put forth in the present
paper.
In Theil (1971), the objective is to minimize the average value of 1/wc(i),
where wc(i) is the weight of the country to which individual i belongs. This
objective is justiﬁed as follows by Theil and Schrage (1977): “...let us assume
that when such a citizen expresses a desire, the chance is wi that he meets
a willing ear. This implies that, in a long series of such expressed desires,
the number of eﬀorts per successful eﬀort is 1/wi. Obviously, the larger this
number, the worse the Parliament is from this individual’s point of view.
Our criterion is to minimize its expectation over the combined population.”
Minimizing this objective yields weights which are proportional to the square
root of the country size.
In Felsenthal and Machover (1999), the objective is the mean majority
deﬁcit, that is the expected value of the diﬀerence between the size of the
majority camp among all citizens and the number of citizens who agree with
the decision. In Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2010) the objective is
to get as close as possible to a situation in which all citizens have the same
3The realized sum of n independent random variables is approximated by its mathe-
matical expectation up to statistical fluctuations of the order
√
n.
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voting power, as measured by the nucleolus of the voting game, a concept
derived from cooperative game theory. Feix et. al. (2011) focuses on the
majority eﬃciency, which is known as Condorcet eﬃciency in Social Choice
Theory.
In Barbera` and Jackson (2006), and Beisbart and Bovens (2007) the
optimality is with respect to a sum of individual utilities, as in the present
paper. The basic message of these papers is that country weights should
be proportional to the importance of the issue for the country as a whole.
In simple settings this provides weights which are simply proportional to
the population size. In these contributions, the individual utilities to be
summed at the collective level are, by assumption, linear in p. Such is
also the case of Beisbart and Hartman (2010), who study the inﬂuence of
inter-country utility dependencies for weights proportional to some power of
the population sizes. This argument in favor of proportionality, called pure
majoritarian in Laslier (2012), is diﬀerent from what we wish to highlight
here. If we could know in advance the importance for the various countries
of the various issues to be voted upon, then we should change the countries’
weights accordingly. Of course this is not possible at the constitutional
stage, but notice that part of this intuition is endogenized in the setting we
propose, along the following reasoning.
Start from weights strictly proportional to the population. Larger coun-
tries are more often successful in that game. Therefore the outcome of the
system is that a citizen (with concave utility) of a larger country is in a sit-
uation of lower marginal utility than a citizen of a smaller country. It may
therefore be eﬃcient to distort the weights in favor of the smaller countries
if the small loss of the many citizens in the larger countries is more than
compensated by the larger beneﬁt for the citizens of the small countries.
The optimal weights should thus exhibit degressive proportionality.
1.4 This paper
Many existing apportionment rules show degressive proportionality, in prin-
ciple and in fact.4 The main contribution of this paper is to provide a
theoretical foundation for the principle of degressive proportionality, which
is not sensitive to knife-edge assumptions such as independence or linearity.
4Leading examples are the US Electoral College, the European Union Council of Min-
isters, and the European Parliament. In countries with bicameral legislature, the upper
house often uses equal representation while the lower house uses proportional representa-
tion. In combination, legislative power can be considered to be distributed with degressive
proportionality.
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Penrose’s square-root law is not robust in the following two aspects.
First, it hinges on the assumption that the voters’ preferences are indepen-
dent random variables. Common sense suggests that this assumption is far
from plausible. Even if not perfectly correlated, citizens of a country tend
to have common interest because of geography, culture, economy, etc. The
independence assumption is also empirically rejected by Gelman, Katz and
Bafumi (2004). To see that the independence assumption is crucial to ob-
taining Penrose Law, consider a group with population n. If there is a slight
correlation in the preferences, we can show by an elementary computation5
that the standard deviation of total utility in the group grows by the order of
n. As will be shown later, the optimal weights which maximize the utilitar-
ian social welfare are not proportional to the square-root of the population
in such a case6. Only in the situation where voters’ opinions are perfectly
independent, the standard deviation grows by the order of
√
n.
Second, and maybe more critically, it is commonly assumed in the appor-
tionment literature that each individual’s utility is additively separable over
the issues, that is, the utility is a linear function of the number of successes.
This assumption leads to convenient properties. For example, expected util-
ity is an aﬃne transformation of the Banzhaf-Penrose index, which allows
us to employ various results obtained in the power-measurement literature.
However, a more reasonable assumption may be that the marginal utility
decreases as the utility level increases, instead of being constant.
Our model brings the decreasing marginal utility assumption commonly
used in Economics into Political Science. When the marginal utility is de-
creasing, the marginal importance of the issue at stake for big countries is
relatively smaller, since they have higher chances of winning. Degressive
proportionality is obtained as the result of equalizing the marginal utility
of the individuals across the countries with heterogeneous sizes so that the
utilitarian social welfare is maximized. In Barbera` and Jackson (2006),
the optimal weights are shown to be proportional to the stake, which de-
pends solely on the utility distribution, exogenously given, independent of
the decision rule. In our model, the stake for each country is determined
endogenously since it depends on the frequency of successes, which in turn
depends on the decision rule. Indeed, we show that the optimal weight is
proportional to the endogenously determined stake. In this sense, our result
5Suppose that var (ui) = σ
2 for ∀i and cov (ui, uj) = σ2ε for ∀i, ∀j 6= i. Then
var
(∑
i ui
)
= nσ2 + n (n− 1)σ2ε increases by the order of n2 iff σε 6= 0.
6This is in accordance with the findings of Beisbart and Hartmann (2010), who show
by simulation that the interest group model (perfect correlation) of Beisbart and Bovens
(2007) is stable, while the aggregate (independent) model is not.
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is consistent with Barbera` and Jackson (2006). However, precisely because
of this endogeneity, we show that the optimal weight should exhibit degres-
sive proportionality. As a consequence, we provide a theoretical foundation
for the principle of degressive proportionality, which is not sensitive to ei-
ther the linearity of the preference or the independence assumption of the
preference distribution, as is in Penrose Law.
In section 2, we describe the model and we discuss in details the relevance
of the concavity assumption. Our main theorem is given in Section 3, where
we ﬁrst compute the optimal weights for two extreme, benchmark, cases,
and then show that the general cases fall between them. Section 4 applies
the theory to the EU case. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are provided in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Objective
There are C countries, and country c ∈ C = {1, · · · , C} has a population
of nc individuals. Let n =
∑
c nc be the total population. We consider
binary decision problems. The status quo is labeled as 0, and the alternative
decision is labeled as 1. Each individual i announces her favorite decision
Xi ∈ {0, 1}, and the ﬁnal decision is denoted by d ∈ {0, 1}.7 A voting
rule is used to take all such decisions so that, from the opinions stated by
the voters, the ﬁnal decision is in accordance with i’s preference with some
frequency:
pi = Pr[Xi = d].
This frequency is the object of preference for individual i, and we denote by
ψ(pi) the utility she attaches to pi. We suppose that all individuals share
the same utility function ψ and make the usual assumption of decreasing
marginal utility. Notice that this last assumption has, in our setting, the
following natural interpretation.
Imagine that, given the voting rule, the society is going to face a sequence
of independent issues. Let T be the total number of independent decisions
which will matter for individual i. Imagine that i receives 1 unit of money
transfer every time the collective decision matches her will, and let t be the
total payoﬀ of this individual. A risk-averse individual evaluates the possible
7Since there are only two alternatives, voting for the favorite decision is a dominant
strategy. The voting game is dominance-solvable and truthful voting is the unique admis-
sible strategy.
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payoﬀs using a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function u(t), concave
in t. The expected utility is then a function of pi, the frequency with which
each social decision matches with the individual’s will:
ψ(pi) =
T∑
t=0
(
T
t
)
pti(1− pi)T−tu(t).
Proposition 1 Suppose u is increasing and concave. Then, ψ is increasing
and concave.
From now on, we will directly use the function ψ, and we do not need
to refer to v. The social goal is deﬁned from the individuals’ satisfaction in
an additive way:
U =
∑
i
ψ(pi).
This means that the collective judgment is based only on individual satis-
faction with no complementarity at the social level. Notice that, because ψ
is concave, the maximization of U tends to produce identical values for the
individual probabilities pi. Here the egalitarian goal is not postulated as a
collective principle but follows from the assumption on individuals’ utility.8
2.2 Egalitarianism
The concavity of ψ can as well be interpreted as the expression of the aversion
to inequality of the social planner (the constitutionalist). If the numbers ui
are money-metric measurements of i’s welfare, the social planner may have,
as her social objective, the maximization of a Kolm-Atkinson index of the
form:
W =
∑
i
ψ(ui).
The social objective W is egalitarian if any Pigou-Dalton transfer in-
creases its value. We recall without proof the following result, well-known
from the theory of inequality measurement (see Dutta 2002). The social
objective is egalitarian if and only if the function ψ is concave, for instance
ψ(ui) = u
α
i for 0 < α < 1.
Proposition 2 W is egalitarian if and only if ψ is concave.
8One exception is allowed later in this paper. In Subsection 3.1, we consider the egali-
tarian case as a benchmark, where U is defined by the Rawlsian criterion.
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As put forth by Bentham (1822)9:
All inequality is a source of evil – the inferior loses more in the
account of happiness than the superior is gained.
This Social Welfare point of view can be philosophically grounded on
an intrinsic inequality aversion of the social planner reﬂected in the formula
W =
∑
i ψ(ui), as well as on a purely utilitarian preference that takes into
account decreasing marginal utility. These two concepts deserve a uniﬁed
name, and it is called the utilitarian-egalitarian argument in Laslier (2012).
An extreme, degenerated case is the Rawlsian objective of maximizing
the well-being of the worst-oﬀ individual. This case is obtained when α tends
to 0, and we will show that it implies identical weights for all countries; see
Proposition 5 below.
Another possible interpretation of the concavity of ψ, based on the sub-
modularity of the underlying preferences, is given in the Appendix.
2.3 Probabilistic Opinion Model
In order to model the correlations between individual opinions, we use a
probabilistic opinion model. More precisely, we assume that individual pref-
erences (Xi)
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}n are drawn from a joint distribution f (X1, · · · , Xn).
We focus our attention on a class of distributions with the following two
properties: (i) all individuals are ex ante unbiased with respect to the two
alternatives,10 and (ii) the preferences are positively correlated within coun-
tries, but independent across countries. We use the parameter µ to describe
the intra-country correlation.
Suppose that voters in country c receive a country-speciﬁc signal Yc ∈
{0, 1}, and each voter i in her country c(i) forms an opinion conditionally on
Yc(i). The conditional probability µ for a voter to follow her country-speciﬁc
signal is the same for every voter in every country, and for both alternatives:
µ = Pr
[
Xi = x|Yc(i) = x
]
, x = 0, 1.
We assume that µ is larger than 1/2, so that Yc can indeed be interpreted
as the general opinion in country c. We could have started the other way
9Quoted by Trannoy (2011).
10If there is a known bias to one of the two alternatives, welfare-maximizing decision
is rather obvious, since the right choice is the preferred alternative and thus the society
has little interest to take a vote. Most interesting are the cases in which the voters are
unbiased ex ante so that voting works as a device to aggregate preferences.
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round and, instead of taking the country’s general opinion as a primitive,
we could have speciﬁed a probability distribution for the correlated opinions
of the citizens of country c. Then Yc would be deﬁned as the majority value
of the variables Xi for i ∈ c. But since we are dealing with large numbers
of individuals (between .4 and 100 millions per country), it is much simpler
to take Yc as the primitive.
The variables Yc ∈ {0, 1} are assumed to be randomly distributed and
independent across countries. This assumption, which is in line with stan-
dard assumptions in the literature, captures the idea that the coalitions of
countries which share a common view on a question show no systematic pat-
tern. This point can be defended in two ways. First, the way some countries’
interests are aligned is itself variable: on some issues larger countries are op-
posed to smaller ones, other issues divide rich countries against poor ones,
East against West, etc. Second, in the spirit of constitutional design, one
may wish by principle to be blind to current correlations of interest among
some countries and give a strong interpretation to the idea that countries are
independent entities. (See Laruelle and Valenciano, 2005, and Barr and Pas-
sarelli, 2009.) We will discuss in the conclusion the consequences of relaxing
this assumption.
2.4 Weighted Voting Rules
Each country c has a weight wc. Without loss of generality we can normalize
the weights so that
C∑
c=1
wc = 1.
We introduce two weighted decision models. In the Council model, the
country has in fact a unique representative, who votes according to the
country’s general opinion Yc. Then the decision d = 1 is taken if the total
weight of the countries who voted for the proposition is strictly larger than
a threshold t, and the decision d = 0 is taken if the total weight of the
countries who voted against the proposition is strictly larger than 1− t. For
Y = (Yc)c∈C ,
dcouncil (Y |w, t) =
{
1 if
∑
cwcYc > t
0 if
∑
cwcYc < t
.
When the threshold is exactly met, d = 1 is taken with a pre-speciﬁed
probability that depends on the realization of Y .
In the Parliament model, the country c has wc representatives, who
vote in proportion of the voters’ opinions. Then, the number of votes at the
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parliament in favor of d = 1 is wcµ for a country such that Yc = 1, and is
wc(1− µ) for a country such that Yc = 0. Here, the decision d = 1 is taken
if the total weight of the representatives who voted for is larger than the
threshold t:
dparliament (Y |w, t) =
{
1 if
∑
cwc (µYc + (1− µ)(1− Yc)) > t
0 if
∑
cwc (µYc + (1− µ)(1− Yc)) < t
.
Indeed, these two models are equivalent up to the threshold.
Proposition 3 dparliament (Y |w, t) = dcouncil
(
Y
∣∣∣w, t−(1−µ)2µ−1 ) .
Proof is immediate.11 If t < 1−µ or t > µ in the Parliament model, the
decision is either d = 0 or d = 1 regardless of the realized values of Y . It is
as if t < 0 or t > 1 in the Council model.
Note that if the threshold is 1/2, the two models are identical. When
a weighted voting rule has the threshold t = 1/2, we call it a weighted
majority rule. Weighted majority rules keep the symmetry between the
two alternative decisions, up to in the limit case where votes are exactly
split. Notice that some voting rules are not even weighted (e.g. UN Security
Council). However, it will be proven that the optimal voting rules are indeed
weighted majority rules, i.e. weighted, with threshold 1/2.
The central idea of this paper is the degressive proportionality.
Definition 1 Weights are said to exhibit degressive proportionality to the
population if
nc < nc′ ⇒ wc ≤ wc′ and wc
nc
≥ wc′
nc′
.
2.5 Questions
The same question can be asked for the Council model and for the Parlia-
ment model. The objective is to maximize the expected collective welfare.
Given are: the population ﬁgures (n = (nc)c∈C), the intra-country homo-
geneity (µ), and the utility function (ψ). For each modelM ∈ {Council, Parliament} ,
the expected social welfare is:
U (w, t) =
∑
i
ψ(pi) =
∑
c
ncψ
(
piMc (w, t)
)
, (1)
11∑
c wc (µYc + (1− µ)(1− Yc)) > t⇔
∑
c wcYc >
t−(1−µ)
2µ−1
.
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with
piMc (w, t) = Pr
[
Xi = d
M (w, t)
]
(2)
for any citizen i in country c. Therefore, our problem is to choose optimal
weights w and the threshold t:12
max
(w,t)
U (w, t) . (3)
3 Optimal weights in theory
In this Section, we ﬁrst characterize the optimal weights for two extreme
cases: linear utility and the Rawlsian social welfare in Section 3.1. Our
main result, obtained in Section 3.2, is stated in the general framework of
probabilistic simple games. This class of games contains precisely describes
how ties are broken, and also contains non-weighted games. We prove that
the optimal games in that class are weighted, with weights which exhibit
degressive proportionality.
3.1 Two benchmarks
The linear case
Suppose that the function ψ is linear; without loss of generality we can
take ψ(p) = p. Then the optimal weights are simply proportional to the
population.
Proposition 4 If U =
∑
i pi the optimal decision rule is a weighted major-
ity, with weights wc proportional to the population.
This result is compatible with the existing models, such as Barbera` and
Jackson (2006) or Fleurbaey (2008). Notice that the result applies to any µ
strictly larger than 1/2. If we allow µ = 1/2, then the model is equivalent
to the aggregate (independence) model of Beisbart and Bovens (2007), in
which the optimal weights are proportional to the square-root of the popula-
tion. But even a slight degree of correlation in the distribution of preferences
implies that the optimal weights are proportional to the population. Propo-
sition 4 gives evidence which indicates that Penrose’s square-root law hinges
on the independence assumption when the utility function is assumed to be
a linear function of the number of successes.
12For the description to be complete, the tie-breaking rule should be specified, although
our main focuses are the weight vector and the threshold. See Section 4 for further
discussion.
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The Rawlsian case
On the other hand, suppose that the social criterion gives absolute pri-
ority to the worst-oﬀ individual, what is sometimes called the MaxMin,
or Rawls’s criterion. Then the optimal weights are independent of country
populations.
Proposition 5 For any µ > 1/2, if U = mini pi the optimal decision rule
is the simple majority among countries: all countries have equal weight.
The Rawlsian case corresponds to the limit where the concavity of ψ
goes to inﬁnity. Obviously, equal weight is an extreme example of degressive
proportionality, where wi/ni decreases most rapidly among all degressively
proportional rules.
3.2 Optimal Apportionment and Simple Games
We introduce the concept of weighted probabilistic simple games correspond-
ing to the weighted voting rules. For each realization of C Bernoulli variables
(Y1, Y2, ..., YC), we can naturally associate the subset of countries (or coali-
tion) for which the Bernoulli variable takes the value 1: {c|Yc = 1}. For any
of the 2C possible coalitions, the social decision can be either to accept or
to reject the proposal. The problem can thus be viewed as the selection of a
subset Γ ⊂ P(C) of winning coalitions, the coalitions for which the proposal
is accepted. For any Γ, the pair (C,Γ) is called a simple game.13 In the
corresponding voting rule dΓ, the decision d = 1 is taken if and only if the
coalition of countries which vote in favor of the proposal belongs to Γ:
dΓ = 1⇔ {c|Yc = 1} ∈ Γ.
Here we generalize the concept of simple games to allow probabilistic
decision rules. For any coalition S, we deﬁne the probability q(S) that the
society accepts the proposition (d = 1) when the countries in coalition S vote
for it. We call the corresponding function q : P(C) → [0, 1] a probabilistic
simple game.
Denote by PSG the set of probabilistic simple games. Notice that any q
in PSG can be uniquely assimilated to a vector in [0, 1]2C (and vice versa).
A simple game Γ is a probabilistic simple game q such that q(S) = 1 for any
S ∈ Γ and q(S) = 0 for any S 6∈ Γ. When the deterministic decisions in a
probabilistic simple game can be represented by a system of weights, we say
that it is a weighted probabilistic simple game:
13In what follows, we will omit C and simply write Γ.
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Definition 2 A probabilistic simple game q is weighted if there exists a
vector of weights w ∈ RC and a threshold t ∈ [0, 1] such that for any S ⊂ C,∑
c∈S
wc > t ⇒ q(S) = 1,∑
c∈S
wc < t ⇒ q(S) = 0.
The subset of coalitions for which the total weight equals the threshold is
called the tie set: T (w, t) = {S ⊂ C | ∑i∈S wi = t}. The restriction of q on
T (w, t) is called the tie-breaking rule.
The beneﬁt of considering a probabilistic simple game is two-fold. First,
as illustrated in the two-country example given in the Introduction, it may be
optimal for the society to take a probabilistic decision. Second, if we consider
only the (deterministic) simple games, we face a maximization problem in
which we choose the set of winning coalitions Γ. Providing an analytical
solution to such discrete problems is quite demanding, and computation for
large values of C is practically impossible in general. Instead, by considering
a larger set of games over the continous space [0, 1]2
C
, we can provide an
analytical solution.
Of course, the advantage is obtained at an expense of certain cost. A
potential problem may be that by considering the entire set of probabilistic
simple games, the optimal game may lie outside of the set of all weighted
games. Our original motivation is to ﬁnd the optimal weights, and indeed
there exist many probabilistic simple games which are not weighted. How-
ever, in the following we show that the optimal games chosen over the entire
set of probabilistic simple games are indeed weighted, and the weights ex-
hibit degressive proportionality, provided that ψ is concave.
For any vector of weights w ∈ RC and any threshold t ∈ [0, 1], we denote
by PSG (w, t) the corresponding set of weighted probabilistic simple games.
As is clear by deﬁnition, any weighted decision rule can be described as a
weighted probabilistic simple game and vice versa. Especially, any weighted
voting rule in the Council model can be described as a weighted probabilistic
simple game q ∈ PSG (w, t) . For the Parliament model, any weighted voting
rule with weight vector w and threshold t can be described as a weighted
probabilistic simple game q ∈ PSG
(
w, t−(1−µ)2µ−1
)
.14
For any vector of population n = (nc)c∈C , intra-country homogeneity
µ, concave utility function ψ, and the model M , we denote by (n, ψ, µ,M)
14See Proposition 3.
15
the corresponding utilitarian problem over the set of all probabilistic simple
games:
max
q∈PSG
∑
c∈C
ncψ (pic (q)) (4)
where pi (q) = (pi1 (q) , ..., piC (q)) is a function deﬁned over PSG, exactly in
the same way as (2).
Proposition 6 Let q∗ be any solution of the problem (n, ψ, µ,M) .
(i) For any two countries c and c′ in C, nc < nc′ ⇒ pi∗c ≤ pi∗c′.
(ii) The associated vector of the frequency of success, pi∗ = pi (q∗) is the
same for any q∗.
We now state the main result of the paper. We show that any solu-
tion to the utilitarian apportionment problem is weighted majority rule (i.e.
threshold is 1/2), with the vector of weights which exhibits degressive pro-
portionality.
Theorem 1 Define the weight vector w∗ so that w∗c is proportional to ncψ
′ (pi∗c ),
where pi∗ is uniquely determined in Proposition 6. Any solution q∗ of (n, ψ, µ,M)
is a weighted probabilistic simple game with the weights w∗ and the threshold
t∗ = 1/2. Moreover, q∗ is unique up to the tie-breaking rule.
Since ψ is concave, an immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 2 The optimal weight w∗ exhibits degressive proportionality.
Moreover, since the optimal threshold is 1/2, the Council model and the
Parliament model are equivalent (Proposition 3). We thus obtain another
Corollary.
Corollary 3 Given n, ψ and µ, the optimal weights are the same in both
the Council model and the Parliament model.
As we mentioned above, some probabilistic simple games cannot be de-
scribed by any weighted voting rule, but any weighted voting rule can be
described as a probabilistic simple game. Therefore, we have
max
(w,t)
U (w, t) ≤ max
q∈PSG
∑
c∈C
ncψ (pic (q)) .
Theorem 1 implies that (w∗, 1/2) is a solution of our original problem (3). It
also provides a formula that characterizes the optimal weights (ncψ
′ (pi∗c ))c∈C
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and threshold (1/2), although it is silent about the tie-breaking rule. Unfor-
tunately, even with this formula, obtaining the exact values of the optimal
weights is challenging, because the probabilities of success pi∗c depend, them-
selves, on the weights. In the next section, we propose a method to compute
the optimal weights numerically.
4 Numerical results
4.1 Methodology
If the optimal tie-breaking rule is constant, say q∗|T (w∗,1/2) = q¯, the optimal
vector of weights is a ﬁxed point of the following application:
Φq¯ : w 7→
(
ncψ
′
(
pic
(
w,
1
2
, q¯
)))
c=1,...,C
where (w, 1/2, q¯) denotes the weighted probabilistic simple game associated
to the vector of weights w, the threshold 1/2 and the constant tie-breaking
rule q¯.
The true optimal tie-breaking rule is unknown. (In fact, as can be de-
duced from the next proposition, any kind of tie-breaking rule can happen
at the optimum.) However, we conjecture that ﬁxing a given (possibly sub-
optimal) tie-breaking rule would not aﬀect the results of the optimization
of the weights. Therefore, we simply chose to limit our attention to the
tie-breaking rule q− that assigns a probability 0 to any coalition in the tie
set. The solution to the apportionment problem is now a ﬁxed point of a
well deﬁned application, Φq− , which can be found numerically. Let wˆ denote
(when it exists) such a solution.
In order to support our conjecture, we provide a way to test, ex post,
that the ﬁxed point wˆ is indeed very close to the true optimum w∗. First,
we show the following proposition:
Proposition 7 For any vector of weights w and tie-breaking rule q|T (w,1/2),
let:
nc =
wc
ψ′
(
pic
(
w, 12 , q|T (w, 12 )
)) .
This vector of population n is such that the weighted probabilistic simple
game (w, 1/2, q|T (w,1/2)) is a solution to the utilitarian problem (n, ψ, µ,M).
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This proposition provides an indirect way to check the quality of a nu-
merical procedure; compare the actual vector of population to the vector
of population for which the candidate game (wˆ, 1/2, q−) is, with certainty,
the optimum. The results below conﬁrm that adopting a ﬁxed arbitrary tie-
breaking rule does not aﬀect the results of the optimization.
4.2 The European Union
We apply our methodology to the European Union. There are C = 27 coun-
tries and 751 seats to be allocated15. We set the intra-country heterogeneity
µ to 1. We use a constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA):
ψ(pic) =
pi1−ρ − 1
1− ρ .
We perform the numerical optimization for ρ = 1 and ρ = 2. In each case
we use the ﬁxed point methodology to ﬁnd the optimum weights and apply
the test to verify the quality of the procedure, as described in the previous
section. In both instances, we ﬁnd that the vector of population for which
our solution is optimal is very close to the actual vector of population. For
each country, the diﬀerence is less than 1000 inhabitants in the ﬁrst case
(ρ = 1) and 3000 inhabitants in the second case (ρ = 2). These ﬁgures,
which are clearly smaller than the typical measurement error in population
estimates, indicate that our procedure performs very well. Moreover, we
observe that the probability to be in the tie set at the optimum is extremely
low (smaller than 10−7), which gives further conﬁdence that, and helps
understand why, the restriction to a particular tie-breaking rule does not
aﬀect the optimization.
15This number of 751 seats is fixed by the Lisbon Treaty and will be applied in 2014.
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Figure 1: Optimal Weights
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We compare the optimal weights (both for ρ = 1 and ρ = 2) to the
current weights at the European Parliament and the weights proposed by
Pukelsheim (2010). The apportionment method used by Pukelsheim (2010),
often called the Base+Prop method, uses a base of 6 seats per country,
with the remaining 589 seats for proportional apportionment using standard
rounding methods. The four vectors of weights are presented in Table 1 along
with the vector of populations. The last column of Table 1 indicates the
value of the probability pi = Pr[Xi = d] = pic(i) that the collective decision
matches individual i’s will. Naturally, the optimal utilitarian weights are
such that this probability depends on the country and is larger in larger
countries.
5 Conclusion
This paper gives a theoretical foundation for the principle of degressive pro-
portionality in the optimal apportionment problem. We consider that the
individual utility is a function of the frequency of success in binary decisions,
and assume that marginal utility is decreasing. By doing so, we provide a
proof which does not hinge on the independence assumption on the distri-
bution of the individual preferences. We believe that our paper provides
fundamental support for the degressive proportionality which is currently
practiced in many apportionment problems.
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pop. Lisbon B+P wˆ, ρ = 1 wˆ, ρ = 2 pi∗c , ρ = 1 pi
∗
c , ρ = 2
Germany 82.4 96 96 108.78 97.27 .712 .698
France 62.9 74 83 88.77 82.32 .666 .662
United Kingdom 60.4 73 80 86.04 80.22 .660 .658
Italy 58.76 73 77 84.16 78.77 .656 .654
Spain 43.76 54 59 66.33 64.51 .620 .624
Poland 38.16 51 52 59.24 58.57 .605 .612
Romania 21.6 33 32 35.90 37.88 .566 .572
Netherlands 16.3 26 26 27.89 30.22 .550 .557
Greece 11.1 22 20 19.54 21.82 .535 .541
Portugal 10.6 22 19 18.62 20.87 .533 .539
Belgium 10.5 22 19 18.52 20.77 .533 .539
Czech Republic 10.3 22 18 18.09 20.32 .532 .538
Hungary 10.1 22 18 17.80 20.01 .532 .538
Sweden 9.0 20 17 16.08 18.20 .529 .534
Austria 8.3 19 16 14.75 16.80 .526 .532
Bulgaria 7.7 18 15 13.82 15.80 .525 .530
Denmark 5.4 13 13 9.85 11.46 .518 .522
Slovak Republic 5.4 13 13 9.79 11.38 .518 .521
Finland 5.3 13 12 9.55 11.12 .517 .521
Ireland 4.2 12 11 7.70 9.04 .514 .517
Lithuania 3.4 12 10 6.26 7.40 .511 .514
Latvia 2.3 9 9 4.25 5.07 .508 .510
Slovenia 2.0 8 8 3.72 4.45 .507 .508
Estonia 1.3 6 8 2.50 3.02 .505 .506
Cyprus 0.8 6 7 1.43 1.74 .503 .503
Luxembourg 0.5 6 7 0.86 1.05 .502 .502
Malta 0.4 6 6 0.76 0.92 .501 .502
Table 1: Population (M.), Base+Prop rounded weights, optimal weights and
individual probabilities
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Our result includes two important benchmark cases in the literature: in
the limit where the concavity diminishes (linear utility), the optimal weights
are proportional to the population (except the knife-edge case of zero inter-
dependence); e.g. Barbera` and Jackson (2006), Fleurbaey (2008), and the
interest group model in Beisbart and Bovens (2007). To the contrary, in
the limit where the concavity goes to inﬁnity (MaxMin utility), the optimal
weights are equal for all countries. Obviously these two weight proﬁles are
the extreme examples of degressive proportionality, and all the utility func-
tions between the two examples above induce degressive proportionality in
between.
These results have been obtained under the assumption that opinions
are independent between countries. It should be clear that allowing for any
kind of correlation between countries would destroy the result. For instance,
suppose that the independence assumption holds except for a given subset of
countries, which are, on the contrary, perfectly correlated. Then the above
model applies if we treat this set of countries as one large country, summing
the populations. Then the optimal weights per country have no reason to
be degressively proportional. Nevertheless, it is true that if the optimal
values of the probabilities pi are increasing with the populations, then the
optimal weights are degressively proportional. This point is proven in the
appendix, as a remark in the proof of the main theorem. Such a paradoxical
situation, where a larger country is satisﬁed less often than a smaller one,
cannot happen under independence or if correlations between countries are
small.
The next step is to investigate more general conditions which would sup-
port the degressive proportionality principle. For example, double correla-
tion within the countries and within the political parties across the countries
is a substantial issue in European politics. Integrating these aspects would
be in the future research agenda.
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A Appendix
A.1 Concavity of ψ (continued)
In addition to the arguments in Section 2.2, we introduce another way to
interpret the concavity of ψ.
Facing the sequence of issues under a ﬁxed voting rule, suppose that the
individual utility is deﬁned over the sequence of successes. The issues come
in a sequence t = 1, 2, · · · . Let zt ∈ {0, 1} be the success (zt = 1) or failure
(zt = 0) at period t, and let z =
(
zt
)
t∈N
. Now utility u is deﬁned on the
equivalence class over the sequences z such that the following limit exists
and is equal to p:
lim
T→∞
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
zt
)
= p. (5)
This is equivalent to saying that the individual is indiﬀerent to the order of
successes/failures in the sequence, and only the frequency matters. Deﬁne
ψ by ψ (p) = u (z) for any sequence which satisﬁes (5). Then, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 8 If u is submodular, then ψ is concave.
Submodularity of u can be interpreted as the substitutability of diﬀerent
issues. An increase in the frequency of successful issues is more favorable
when there are less successes among the other issues.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. It is straightforward to show that:
ψ′ (p) = T
T−1∑
t=0
(
T − 1
t
)
pt (1− p)T−1−t {v (t+ 1)− v (t)} ,
ψ′′ (p) = T (T − 1)
T−2∑
t=0
(
T − 2
t
)
pt (1− p)T−2−t
[ {v (t+ 2)− v (t+ 1)}
−{v (t+ 1)− v (t)}
]
.
Since v is increasing and concave, v (t+ 1)− v (t) > 0 and
{v (t+ 2)− v (t+ 1)} − {v (t+ 1)− v (t)} < 0.
Hence, ψ′ (p) > 0 and ψ′′ (p) < 0 for p ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof of Proposition 4. The objective is U =
∑
i Pr[Xi = d]. Con-
ditionally on a realization of the vector of variables (Yc)c∈C ∈ {0, 1}C , the
social utility of taking decision d = 0 or 1 is
U(d = 0) =
∑
c:Yc=0
µnc +
∑
c:Yc=1
(1− µ)nc,
U(d = 1) =
∑
c:Yc=1
µnc +
∑
c:Yc=0
(1− µ)nc,
so that d = 1 is strictly better if and only if (2µ − 1)∑c:Yc=1 nc > (2µ −
1)
∑
c:Yc=0
nc. Since µ > 1/2, we know which decision d maximizes the cri-
terion, that is majority rule: d = 1 if
∑
c:Yc=1
nc >
∑
c:Yc=0
nc and d = 0
otherwise. This optimal rule is indeed a weighted majority rule with weight
wc = nc/
∑
c′ nc′ and threshold 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Proposition 4, if nc = 1 for all c, the simple
majority rule with the equal weight maximizes the sum of the frequencies.
That is, for any rule,
∑
c pic ≤ Cpeq, where peq is the probability of winning
under the equal weight. Now, suppose that peq < minc pic. Then, p
eq < pic
for all c, implying Cpeq <
∑
c pic, a contradiction. Therefore, minc pic ≤ peq
for any rule. Hence, maxminc pic ≤ peq. The maximum is attained by the
equal weight.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us remind that pi : PSG → [0, 1]C is the
function deﬁned in (4). For any individual i in country c,
pic (q) = Pr [Xi = Yc] Pr [Yc = d (q)] + Pr [Xi 6= Yc] Pr [Yc 6= d (q)]
= 1− µ+ (2µ− 1)Pr [Yc = d (q)] . (6)
Given a probabilistic simple game q, q (S) is the probability that d = 1 is
chosen. Therefore,
Pr [Yc = d (q)] =
∑
S
Pr (S)
(
q(S)1{c∈S} + (1− q(S))1{c 6∈S}
)
=
∑
{S|c∈S}
Pr (S) q(S) +
∑
{S|c 6∈S}
Pr (S) (1− q(S)) (7)
where Pr (S) denotes the probability that the set {c|Yc = 1} coincides with
S ⊂ C. Notice that pic is aﬃne in q. Hence, the image pi (PSG) is convex in
[0, 1]C .
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Since ψ is strictly concave, the maximization problem
∑
c ncψ (pi) subject
to pi ∈ pi (PSG) has a unique solution pi∗. Any solution q∗ of the problem
(n, ψ, µ,M) satisﬁes pi∗ = pi (q∗).
Suppose now that there exists c, c′ ∈ C with nc < nc′ and pi∗c > pi∗c′ .
Consider then q̂ deﬁned by q̂ (σcc′ (S)), where σcc′ is the permutation of C
that exchanges c and c′. We get pic (q̂) = pi
∗
c′ , pic′ (q̂) = pi
∗
c and pik (q̂) =
pi∗k, ∀k 6= c, c′. Then,
∑
c∈C ncψ (pic (q̂)) >
∑
c∈C ncψ (pi
∗) , which contradicts
the optimality of pi∗.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let q∗ be a solution, and pi∗ = pi(q∗) be the cor-
responding vector of frequency of success. By (6) and (7), we can explicitly
compute the ﬁrst order condition for q (S) :
∂
∂q (S)
∑
c∈C
ncψ (pic (q)) = (2µ− 1)Pr (S)
(∑
c∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q))−
∑
c/∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q))
)
.
Hence, ∀S ⊂ C,∑
c∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q)) >
∑
c 6∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q)) ⇒ q∗(S) = 1,∑
c∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q)) <
∑
c 6∈S
ncψ
′ (pic (q)) ⇒ q∗(S) = 0,
which is equivalent to:∑
c∈S
ncψ
′(pic (q)) >
1
2
∑
c∈C
niψ
′(pic (q)) ⇒ q∗(S) = 1,
∑
c∈S
ncψ
′(pic (q)) <
1
2
∑
c∈C
niψ
′(pic (q)) ⇒ q∗(S) = 0.
Deﬁning the vector of weights w∗ by w∗c =
ncψ
′(pi∗c )∑
c′∈C
nc′ψ
′(pi∗c′)
∀c ∈ C, we conclude
that: ∑
c∈S
w∗c >
1
2
⇒ q∗(S) = 1,
∑
c∈S
w∗c <
1
2
⇒ q∗(S) = 0,
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meaning that the probabilistic simple game q∗ is weighted and can be rep-
resented by the vector w∗ and the threshold 1/2: q∗ ∈ PSG (w∗, 1/2). Fur-
thermore, by Proposition 6, we know that for any c, c′ ∈ C with nc < nc′ ,
pi∗c ≤ pi∗c′ , which implies in turn that w∗c/nc = ψ′(pi∗c ) ≤ ψ′(pi∗c′) = w∗c′/nc′
because of the concavity of ψ.
The last thing we need to show is that the vector w∗ is increasing. Let c
and c′ be two countries such that nc ≤ nc′ , and assume that w∗c = ncψ′(pi∗c ) >
nc′ψ
′(pi∗c′) = w
∗
c′ .
As a ﬁrst step, let us show that there always exists a coalition S such
that c ∈ S, c′ 6∈ S and q∗ (S) < q∗ (σcc′ (S)). By contradiction, assume that
for any S which contains c but not c′, q∗ (S) ≥ q∗ (σcc′ (S)) . By (7),
Pr [Yc = d (q
∗)]
=
∑
{S|c,c′∈S}
Pr (S) q∗(S) +
∑
{S|c,c′ 6∈S}
Pr (S) (1− q∗(S))
+
∑
{S|c∈S,c′ /∈S}
Pr (S) q∗(S) +
∑
{S|c 6∈S,c′∈S}
Pr (S) (1− q∗(S)) .
Then,
Pr [Yc = d (q
∗)]− Pr [Yc′ = d (q∗)]
=
∑
{S|c∈S,c′ /∈S}
{Pr (S) (2q∗(S)− 1) + Pr (σcc′ (S)) (1− 2q∗ (σcc′ (S)))} ≥ 0.
Note that Pr (S) = Pr (σcc′ (S)). Using (6), this implies pi
∗
c ≥ pi∗c′ . By
Proposition 6, we know that pi∗c ≤ pi∗c′ . Therefore, pi∗c = pi∗c′ , which implies
w∗c < w
∗
c′ , a contradiction.
Now, pick a coalition S containing c but not c′ with q∗ (S) < q∗ (σcc′ (S)).
We deﬁne another game q′ by:
q′ (S) = q∗ (S) + ε
q′ (σcc′ (S)) = q
∗ (σcc′ (S))− ε
q′(T ) = q∗(T ), ∀T 6= S, σcc′ (S)
Then, we have pi′c = pi
∗
c +κ, pi
′
c′ = pi
∗
c′−κ and pi′k = pi∗k for any k 6= c, c′ where
κ = 4 (2µ− 1)Pr (S) ε. Hence, U (q′) > U (q∗) , contradicting the optimality
of q∗.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let w = (wi)1≤i≤c be any vector of positive
weights and q0|T (w,1/2) any associated tie-breaking rule. The corresponding
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probabilistic simple game is denoted q0 = q(w, 12 , q
0
|T (w,1/2)).
We show that it is always possible to ﬁnd a vector of populations n such
that q0 is optimal for the utilitarian problem (n, ψ, µ,M).
As a ﬁrst step, we observe that the set of weighted probabilistic simple
games PSG(w, 12) can be characterized as the solution to the following linear
maximization problem:
max
q∈PSG
∑
c∈C
wcpic(q).
If we expand this expression we get:
∀q ∈ PSG,
C∑
c=1
wcpic(q) =
C∑
c=1
wi
 1
2C
∑
S|c∈S
q(S) +
1
2C
∑
S|c 6∈S
(1− q(S))

=
1
2C
∑
S
[
q(S)
∑
i∈S
wc + (1− q(S))(
∑
c 6∈S
wc)
]
=
1
2C
∑
S
∑
c 6∈S
wc +
1
2C
∑
S
q(S)(
∑
c∈S
wc −
∑
c 6∈S
wc).
In order to maximize this quantity, it is indeed optimal to choose q(S) = 1
whenever
∑
c∈S wc >
1
2 and q(S) = 0 whenever
∑
i∈S wc <
1
2 . The choice
of q(S) for the coalitions in the tie set T (w, 12) does not aﬀect the quantity.
Therefore, we conclude that the solution set of the above maximization prob-
lem corresponds exactly to the set of weighted probabilistic simple games
with weights w and threshold 12 : PSG(w, 12).
We deﬁne P = max
q∈PSG
∑
c
wcpic(q) and D = {pi ∈ (R+)C |
∑
c
wcpic ≤ P}.
We remark that the maximum value of U over D is necessarily greater or
equal to the maximum value of U over PSG:
max
q∈PSG
C∑
c=1
ncψ(pic(q)) ≤ max
pi∈D
C∑
c=1
ncψ(pic).
We now exhibit a vector of populations n for which q0 is solution to the
second maximization problem. We know that the solution of this problem
veriﬁes the following conditions:
ncψ′(pic)
nc′ψ
′(pic′ )
= wcwc′
∀c, c′ ∈ C∑
c∈C
wcpic = P
.
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Setting nc =
wc
ψ′(pic(q0))
for all c ∈ C, pi(q0) becomes solution to the maximiza-
tion of U over D. By the previous remark, we conclude that q0 is solution
to the utilitarian problem (n, ψ, µ,M). This achieves the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. We ﬁrst show that for any p1, p2 ∈ Q with
p1 < p2, we have u (p1) + u (p2) ≤ 2u ((p1 + p2) /2) . To see that, let z be a
sequence which repeats
1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(p1+p2)/2
, 0, · · · , 0
, and let z′ be a sequence which
repeats 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(p2−p1)/2
, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(p1+p2)/2
, 0, · · · , 0
 .
Then, u (z) = u (z′) = (p1 + p2) /2. Now, obviously z∨z′ is a sequence which
repeats 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
, 0, · · · , 0
 ,
and z ∧ z′ is a a sequence which repeats0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(p2−p1)/2
, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
, 0, · · · , 0
 .
By assumption, u is submodular: u (z) + u (z′) ≥ u (z ∨ z′) + u (z ∧ z′).
Hence, ψ (p1) +ψ (p2) ≤ 2ψ ((p1 + p2) /2) . By continuity and monotonicity,
ψ is concave.
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